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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-2785
___________
DENNIS KEITH DIXON,
Appellant
v.
STERN & EISENBURG, PC and Employees; DOES 1-50
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5:14-cv-04551)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Junior
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 8, 2016
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 13, 2016)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Dennis Dixon appeals pro se from an order of the District Court granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. We will affirm.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

On behalf of its client, Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Appellee Stern & Eisenberg PC
mailed a series of notices to Dixon and his spouse, captioned as “Combined Notice Under
Act 6 and Act 91 – Take Action to Save Your Home From Foreclosure.” The notices
stated that Dixon’s mortgage on his home was in default, and described Dixon’s rights as
homeowner in addition to setting out avenues for repayment assistance. The notices
identified the property address, the loan account number, the Original Lender (as “Option
One Mortgage Corporation, a California Corporation”), and the Current Lender/Servicer
(as “Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Trustee for ABFC 2006-OPT1 Trust,
Asset Backed Funding Corporation Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-OPT1[;] By
its Servicer, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC”). The notices set out the total amount past due
and provided Ocwen’s mailing address for the submission of any payment to cure the
default. Dixon sued.
Dixon’s complaint, filed in the District Court on July 31, 2014, alleged that Stern
& Eisenberg PC and fifty unnamed employees violated the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. After Dixon amended his complaint
and the defendants moved to dismiss the case for the failure to state a claim, the District
Court notified the parties that it intended to convert the dismissal motion to a motion for
summary judgment, and provided the parties time to submit any additional materials.
The District Court thereafter granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. This
appeal followed.
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard that the
district court used. Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 416-17 (3d Cir. 2015).
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from conduct that harasses, oppresses, or
abuses a person. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. A debt collector also may not “use any false,
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The FDCPA further prohibits debt collectors from using
unfair or unconscionable means of collecting a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. And, the
FDCPA sets requirements for notice to consumers and rules for the validation of debts
that consumers dispute in writing. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. The statute also restricts the use
of forms that create the false impression that a person or entity other than the debtor is
involved with the collection of a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692j. Dixon’s complaint invokes all
of these subsections.
Notwithstanding that scattershot approach to Dixon’s attempt to invoke the
FDCPA, Dixon’s case primarily concerns § 1692e, which prohibits the use of “use any
false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means[.]” Dixon argues that the notices
that he received were deceptive. In essence, Dixon believes that Stern & Eisenberg PC
violated the FDCPA because there were purported defects in the way that his mortgage
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was conveyed to Wells Fargo from the original lender. Although Dixon spins this
argument thread into a tapestry of FDCPA allegations, the key question is whether there
is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Stern & Eisenberg PC was deceptive
when it listed Wells Fargo as the “Current Lender” on the notices it sent. There is not.
We consider whether the least sophisticated debtor would find a debt collector’s
statement deceptive or misleading, applying an objective standard. Jensen, 791 F.3d at
419-20. The standard is lower than that of a “reasonable debtor,” id. at 418, and it
“prevents liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices by
preserving a quotient of reasonableness and presuming a basic level of understanding and
willingness to read with care.” Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d
993, 997 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Also, “[a] debtor simply
cannot be confused, deceived, or misled by an incorrect statement unless it is material.”
Jensen, 791 F.3d at 421. A statement is material “if it is capable of influencing the
decision of the least sophisticated debtor.” Id.
Dixon’s arguments focus almost entirely on issues he has with how the mortgage
was assigned to Wells Fargo. But in the notices, Stern & Eisenberg PC did not explicitly
represent anything about any procedures or technicalities of any assignment concerning
the mortgage. The details of the chain of assignment do not appear directly relevant to
any statement in the notices, which focus on disclosing a debtor’s rights and remedies.
Whatever might or might not have occurred concerning the technicalities of the
assignment to Wells Fargo is not material under the circumstances of this case. See id. at
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420-21; Hahn v. Triumph P’ships LLC, 557 F.3d 755, 758 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A statement
cannot mislead unless it is material, so a false but non-material statement is not
actionable.”). Moreover, as the District Court observed, Dixon has already lost a case
concerning whether it was permissible for his mortgage to be assigned under the terms of
the mortgage and related agreements. See Dixon v. Option One Mortgage Corp., et al.,
No. 5:13-cv-3199, at D. Ct. Doc. No. 17.
Nor has Dixon shown that the mere act of naming Wells Fargo as the “Current
Lender” is material for purposes of enforcing the FDCPA. Dixon does not state or offer
any evidence that he has attempted to send mortgage payments that he owes to some
other entity, that he was confused about how to cure a default, or that he risked (or feared
that he risked) the prospect of having to satisfy the same debt to multiple parties. Cf.
Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 757 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding lack
of Article III standing to challenge an assignment when plaintiffs had “not pleaded or
otherwise suggested that they ever paid defendants more than the amounts due [on their
note], or that they ever received a bill or demand from any entity other than defendants,”
or that there was “any threat or institution of foreclosure proceedings . . . by any entity
other than defendants”). In addition, Dixon has never set out how the hypothetical “least
sophisticated debtor” might have had a doubt about how to satisfy its debt obligations,
regardless of whether he was confused himself. See Jensen, 791 F.3d at 419-20 (the
“least sophisticated debtor” is an objective standard).
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For its part, Stern & Eisenberg PC has produced the note held by Wells Fargo,
which is a negotiable instrument that is indorsed “in blank” in this case. That means that
the holder in due course of the note is entitled to all rights under the note, including the
right to enforce payment of the debt. See J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Murray, 63 A.3d
1258, 1266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (“[W]e conclude that the Note secured by the Mortgage
in the instant case is a negotiable instrument under the PUCC. As such we find [the
defendant’s] challenges to the chain of possession by which [plaintiff] came to hold the
Note immaterial to its enforceability[.]”). The note is the instrument reflecting Dixon’s
promise to repay the debt, and it is not deceptive to call Wells Fargo the creditor under
these facts. And contrary to Dixon’s argument, it is not material on these facts that the
written assignments that Stern & Eisenberg PC recorded post-date when it sent the
notices. Wells Fargo’s creditor status here is not dependent on a written memorialization
and recordation of an assignment of the mortgage. See 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3205(b) (“an
instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession
alone until specially indorsed.”) (emphasis added); Murray, 63 A.3d at 1266.
Thus, for purposes of Dixon’s claims in this case, there is no genuine issue of
material fact that for Stern & Eisenberg PC to name Wells Fargo as the “Current Lender”
in the notices it sent was truthful, to the extent it was even a material statement for it to
do so. See Powell v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 782 F.3d 119, 125 (4th Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he record clearly shows that the judgment against Powell had indeed been assigned
by Platinum Financial to Palisades and that the defendants’ representation of this fact was
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therefore not false.”); Hahn, 557 F.3d at 757 (“[A]s we have concluded that the statement
is true, the case is over.”).
Dixon also argues that Stern & Eisenberg PC’s act of recording the mortgage
assignments to Wells Fargo after it had sent the notices was itself a deceptive act that
amounts to a separate and independent FDCPA violation. The FDCPA, however,
prohibits debt collectors from using false or misleading representations “in connection
with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (emphasis added). Under the
circumstances of this case and viewing the record as a whole, it is evident that recording
those mortgage assignments was not connected to the notices that Stern & Eisenberg PC
sent, and there is nothing in the record showing that the recording was otherwise used in
connection with a further effort to collect on a debt.
Rather, recording the assignments protects the creditor from the circumstance
where a downstream bona fide purchaser obtains the property without notice of the
mortgage, and does not affect the validity of any assignment itself of the right to collect
on the debt that the mortgage secures. See Montgomery County v. MERSCORP Inc.,
795 F.3d 372, 376-77 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that Pennsylvania law does not create a
duty to record all land conveyances and observing that recording is not necessary to
validly convey property). Section 1692e does not apply to the circumstances presented
here involving Stern & Eisenberg PC’s efforts to later record the mortgage assignment.
The claims under the other FDCPA provisions that Dixon cites fail as well.
Section 1692d concerns conduct that harasses, oppresses, or abuses a person.
7

Considering Dixon’s allegations and the summary judgment record as a whole, the only
conduct that could even potentially have been thought to harass, oppress, or abuse was
that Stern & Eisenberg PC sent six copies of the notices to Dixon and his spouse, rather
than just one copy. As the defendants noted, however, they sent those notices in order to
comply with state law. See Pennsylvania Loan Interest and Protection Law (“Act 6”), 41
Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 101 et seq.; Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency Law (“Act 91”), 35
Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 1680.401c et seq. The multiple mailings that Dixon received merely
covered the different names and addresses indicated on the mortgage documents, plus the
need to send via both regular and certified mail. Otherwise, there is no evidence in the
record that any defendant wrote again, called, visited, or otherwise contacted Dixon or his
spouse. We conclude that the defendants’ straightforward and one-time effort to comply
with state and federal notice requirements through one round of mailings, with no other
communication set out in the record, does not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.
Relatedly, sending those required notices to the debtor was not an unfair or
unconscionable means of collecting a debt under the circumstances of this case. See 15
U.S.C. § 1692f. The only potentially “unfair” practice concerned the contention that the
assignment to Wells Fargo was not proper; as discussed above, the evidence of the
possession of the indorsed-in-blank mortgage note precludes that argument.
The record also shows no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Stern
& Eisenberg PC complied with § 1692g. That statutory provision concerns procedures
when a consumer disputes a debt. Notably, as the District Court concluded, the provision
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does not require a debt collector to independently investigate a debt before it begins
collection activities, let alone affirmatively verify every aspect of the chain of assignment
of the right to collect on a debt. See, e.g., Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs.,
Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1174 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Within reasonable limits, [debt collectors]
were entitled to rely on their client’s statements to verify the debt. . . . [and] the FDCPA
did not impose upon them any duty to investigate independently the claims presented by
[the creditor].”); Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 406 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that
verification does not require a debt collector to “vouch for the validity of the underlying
debt”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, that provision requires a debt collector
to seek information about a debt from the creditor once a consumer disputes a debt. See
Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that after verification
was requested, the information provided was “sufficient to inform [the debtor] of the
amounts of his debts, the services provided, and the dates on which the debts were
incurred.”). Nothing in the record shows, and Dixon does not argue, that Dixon sent the
requisite written notice disputing the debt. Claims based on this provision therefore have
no evidentiary support as well.
Finally, we may easily dispense with the purported violations under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692j, which bars the use of forms that may create the false impression about who is
involved with collecting a debt. So far as the lenders’ side of things is concerned, the
notices that Stern & Eisenberg PC sent to Dixon do not identify any person or entity other
than Stern & Eisenberg PC, Wells Fargo NA, and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. None of
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the notices can be read as constituting a “form” that created the impression that any
additional entity was participating in the collection of the debt. And, as discussed above,
Wells Fargo NA was not misrepresented as the “Lender” for purposes of providing notice
to Dixon and his spouse, and Dixon has produced no evidence of—let alone even
named—any other entity that should have been listed so as to avoid creating a false
impression about who was involved in the collection effort. Consequently, there is also
no genuine issue of material fact that the defendants complied with 15 U.S.C. § 1692j.
The District Court was correct to grant summary judgment in favor of Stern &
Eisenberg, PC and the unnamed defendants. Consequently, we will affirm the District
Court’s judgment.
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